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Non-technical summary:
The point of departure for this study is the fact that many start-ups do not sur-
vive the rst years of existence. Although many studies have examined factors
that inuence the survival of rms, up to now economists have neglected to
examine the development on the way to market drop-out. Research questions
of particular interest are as follows: Do peculiarities exist in the employment
development prior to market drop-out? Is there a point in time during which
rms recognise that they cannot survive? And is there an observable point in
time during which rms start to adjust employment downward to prepare for
the market drop-out? The data source used comes from a survey of 12,000
Eastern and Western German rms founded at the beginning of the 1990s.
The survey, for which information regarding the post-entry performance was
gathered, resulted in about 3,700 interviews. This paper will make an empiri-
cal contribution to conrm the stylised fact that market exits achieve a worse
performance in the years before they exit. For this reason the paper will evalu-
ate whether market exits dier signicantly in their employment development
in the years before market drop-out compared to surviving rms that have
been selected using a non-parametric matching approach that has often been
applied in labour economics up to now. The comparison of the employment
growth rates among the thus formed groups reveals that in most cases the
matched surviving rms experience higher growth rates compared to their ex-
iting counterparts in the years before market exit. Pooling of the data leads to
signicant dierences in the growth paths in favour of the matched surviving
rms up to 3 years before the market drop-out of the exiting rms. More-
over, the data used indicate that there exists a \shadow of death" sneaking
around the corner. A considerable number of rms that exited from 1995 until
1998 has experienced continuing employment losses or at least an employment
stagnation over several years before market exit.
1 Introduction
Numerous studies in Industrial Economics deal with survival (Bruderl et al.
1992, Harho et al. 1998, Prantl 2000) and the growth of new and established
rms (Evans 1987, Harho et al. 1998). Moreover, various papers evaluate
the employment-creating potential of new and of established rms (Rajan and
Zingales 1998). The results found hold for dierent countries, time periods
and industries and lead to a number of stylized facts. First, there is a strong
correlation between market entry and exit rates for various industries (Geroski
1995, Caves 1998). Second, the distribution of rm size is highly skewed to the
right and approximately follows a log-normal distribution (Schmalensee 1989).
Moreover, initial rm size has a negative inuence on growth in subsequent pe-
riods, indicating a deviation from Gibrat's Law at least for small rms (Sutton
1997). Last but not least, numerous empirical studies found that rm size and
age inuence the growth of young rms negatively, but the survival positively
(Evans 1987, Audretsch 1995).
All these facts concern the post-entry performance of rms. Point of depar-
ture for this study is the fact that many start-ups do not survive the rst years
(Storey 1994). Although many studies have examined factors that inuence
the survival of rms, economists have neglected to examine the development
of the way to market drop-out hitherto. Research questions of special interest
are: Do peculiarities exist in the employment development prior to market
drop-out? Is there a point in time in which rms recognize that they cannot
survive? And is there an observable point in time in which rms start to adjust
employment downward to prepare for the market drop-out?
Only a few studies exist that deal with this so called pre-exit performance
of rms. Wagner (1999) examines the life history of three cohorts of exiting
manufacturing rms in the German federal state Lower Saxony. The main
result is that there is no \shadow of death" sneaking around the corner, i.e.
rms that exit the market do not experience a gradual employment decline
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over several years before market exit. Olley and Pakes (1996) use data from
the telecommunication equipment industry to estimate a production function.
They nd empirical support that the rm's productivity is a major determi-
nant of whether or not a rm exits.
This paper makes an empirical contribution to conrm the stylized fact that
market exits achieve a worse performance in the years before exit. For this
reason we evaluate whether market exits dier signicantly in their employ-
ment development in the years before market drop-out compared to surviving
rms that have been selected using a non-parametric matching approach. The
matching approach permits to nd a surviving rm for every market exit that
does not dier in important characteristics measured at start-up. Since the
rms do not dier in observable characteristics at start-up, either unobserv-
able factors lead to the worse performance or conditions that presuppose the
market drop-out develop over time.
The comparison of the employment growth rates among the thus formed
groups reveals that in most cases the matched surviving rms experience higher
growth rates compared to their exiting counterparts in the years before market
exit. Pooling of the data leads to signicant dierences in the growth paths
in favor of the matched surviving rms up to three years before market drop-
out of the exiting rms. Moreover, the data used indicate that there exists
a \shadow of death" sneaking around the corner. A considerable number of
rms exiting from 1995 until 1998 has suered from continuing employment
losses or has exhibited at least an employment stagnation over several years
before market exit.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section briey presents the data
and section 3 contains some descriptives. Section 4 presents the matching
procedure and the success analyses, i.e. the results from the subsequent com-
parison of employment growth rates between both groups. The last section
summarizes the ndings.
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2 Data
The data set contains 12,000 observations that have been included in a tele-
phone questioning in 1999 (Almus 2000).
1
About 135,000 observations from
the ZEW Foundation Panel West, as well as more than 112,000 rm units
from the ZEW Foundation Panel East form the parent population (Almus
et al. 2000). All rms considered for the drawing of the sample have an ear-
liest foundation date that was between 1990 and 1993 reported by CRED-
ITREFORM
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, and operate in the manufacturing, building, trade or selected
branches of the service sector and do not have the legal forms of freelance, reg-
istered society or registered cooperative. First of all, there is a stratication
with respect to Eastern and Western German rms. 6,000 rms each build
the sample. Second, the other main stratication criterion is an indicator
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that gives information as to whether the respective rm has possibly exited
the market or is still active. We oversample rms with these indicators when
drawing the sample to get a satisfactory number of interviews with exiting
rms for the empirical analyses since these rm groups show a worse response
behavior compared to market active rms (Almus 2000).
The survey aims to obtain rm information relating to
 a possible market exit (date, reasons, nancial losses to several parties),
 the market entry (foundation type, date, legal form etc.),
 organizational changes (legal form, merger, acquisition etc.)
 the rm owners (rms and/or persons separated in the categories Eastern
and Western Germany and foreign countries)
 the annual development of the number of employees and
 the receipt of public support.
1
The questioning is part of a project co-nanced by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
(DFG) and entitled \Survival, growth and fast growth of start-ups in Eastern and Western
Germany".
2
CREDITREFORM is the largest German credit rating agency.
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This indicator based on information of CREDITREFORM and points to problems in
handling the data set or to dierent stages of bankruptcy proceedings.
3
We used a CATI system
4
to carry out the survey that was divided into 3
stages. In the rst stage, a rm representative was expected to answer the
survey. Afterwards, a rm owner was chosen for all rms that did not answer
the survey completely in the rst stage. If no contact could be established
with the selected owner person or the person refused to answer the survey
questions, a second owner person was chosen.
With 3,702 completed interviews
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out of 12,000 sample observations, the re-
sponse rate was about 31 per cent, which is relatively high compared to other
German studies conducted by telephone.
6
Further restrictions with respect
to the date of start-up, employment gures and the type of foundation are
necessary to obtain the data set for the empirical analyses. Observations for
the present study have a foundation date between 1990 and 1993 and complete
annual employment histories to track the observations over time. Moreover,
rms must be true start-ups, i.e. this study excludes partial and complete
take-overs from the following analyses. This yields a data set containing 1,795
observations, 507 of which are market exits.
Apart from the information conducted in the interviews, other details from
the ZEW Foundation Panels East and West (e.g. human capital of the rm
participants) and from external data sources (e.g. classication of regional
origin (BFLR 1995)) are available.
3 Descriptives
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the main variables used for the em-
pirical analyses. The average number of employees at start-up is about 7,
whereas the median, a measure that is less suspectible to outliers, is 3. The
median conrms the ndings of other studies that new rms start very small
4
CATI stands for computer assisted telephone interviewing.
5
The term \complete interviews" refers to a nal status of the CATI system. Nevertheless
the individual observation dier in their information content.
6
For analyses dealing with the survival of rms a statement regarding the survival status
is possible for additional 2,234 rms.
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and create in most cases only a workplace for the founder(s). Additionally,
we analyzed the employment development by means of kernel density esti-
mates (Yatchew 1998). For the years 1990-1999 the distribution of the rm
size is skewed to the right and approximately follows a log-normal distribution
(Schmalensee 1989, Sutton 1997).
7
The average number of employees and the
median increase over time. The mean (median) increased from about 8 resp 3
employees in 1990 to 11 resp 5 employees in 1999.
>> insert Table 1 about here <<
The annual employment growth rates are positive (except for the period from
1998 to 1999) but decrease over time. The decrease in the annual employment
rates is due to an increase of the number of rms (new start-up cohorts) over
time used to calculate the growth rates. The older the rms the weaker is the
age inuence on the growth rate (Evans 1987), thus indicating a decrease of
the annual employment growth. Moreover, most rms in the data set neither
grow nor shrink at all. The median growth rate in all years equals 0. And
only a small number of rms realize above average growth rates and belong to
the so-called group of \gazelles" or \fast growing rms" (Storey 1994, Bruderl
and Preisendorfer 2000).
In addition to this, Table 1 presents dummy variables that contain information
on the year of foundation, the industry classication and the legal form, i.e.
whether they had been founded under one of the following liability limiting
legal forms: GmbH or GmbH&Co.KG (limited liability company) or AG (joint
stock company). The remaining dummy variables indicate the number of owner
persons involved in the foundation process, the human capital endowment of
the founder(s) as well as two dummy variables that state whether the rm
was founded in Eastern or Western Germany and if other rms were involved
7
Figure 1 in the appendix contains the results of the kernel density estimates. The
analysis includes all rms with valid employment numbers in the respective year.
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in the foundation. Additionally, three dummy variables indicate the regional
density of the counties where the rms come from. The three groups (high
density, medium density and low density) were derived from a classication of
German counties from the BFLR (1995)
4 Empirical analyses
4.1 Method
Up to now the data set contains observations of market exits (N
exit
=507) and
surviving rms (N
survive
=1,288) that dier signicantly in important charac-
teristics measured at start-up. A computation of the growth rates for the
market exits in the years before exit is quite easy. But, we are not able to
measure the respective employment eects for the surviving rms before mar-
ket drop-out since these are still alive. A comparison of the average growth
rates of both groups at this time would lead to biased results because of these
dierences. In the statistical analysis we want to evaluate the performance of
the market exits in the years prior to death and compare this with the perfor-
mance of rms that survive but do not dier from the exiting rms in basic
rm characteristics measured at start-up. These characterictics include
 initial rm size,
 year of foundation,
 industry classication,
 regional origin,
 human capital of the founder,
 legal form and
 existence of participants (owner persons as well as rms).
The best and easiest way to nd a partner for every exiting rm is to select the
surviving one with exactly the same values in the selected matching variables.
But the relative high number of these variables and the availability of only
6
about 1,300 matching partners impede this approach.
To circumvent these diculties non-parametric matching methods which be-
came popular recently in labor-market evaluation studies represent a powerful
alternative (Lechner et al. 2000). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) point out that
matching \[: : :] is a method for selecting units from a large reservoir of poten-
tial comparisons to produce a comparison group of modest size in which the
distribution of covariates is similar to the distribution in the treated group.".
For this reason non-parametric matching represents a good method to evaluate
the pre-exit performance of the market exits.
The matching algorithm used corresponds closely to the one applied by Hujer
et al. (1997). To reduce the multidimensional problem arising from the rela-
tively high number of covariates to a one-dimensional problem, we estimate a
probit model initially (Maddala 1983).
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The decision (y
i
) whether the rm has
exited the market (y
i
= 1) or not (y
i
= 0) serves as the endogenous variable.
The probit model estimates if rm i has left the market
E[y
i
jx
i
] = Pr(y
i
= 1jx
i
) = (x
0
i
) 8 i = 1 : : :N
given a vector x
i
containing the set of matching characteristics. () is the
cdf of the standard normal and  is the parameter vector to be estimated.
After estimating the probit model the unbounded score x
0
i
^
 is calculated for
every observation. We prefer the unbounded rather than the bounded propen-
sity score (x
0
i
^
) because it has preferable distribution properties (Hujer et
al. 1997)
9
. The upper half of Figure 2 shows histograms for the unbounded
propensity score (x
0
^
) before the matching process started. They full an
important assumption for the matching process since both graphs overlap to
a great extent and hence indicating similar distributions of the two groups
(Lechner et al. 2000).
>> insert Figure 2 about here <<
8
The results of the probit model are not reported but available upon request.
9
See also the literature cited in this paper.
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The matching process proceeds then as follows:
1. Divide the rm observations with respect to their survival status.
2. Randomly select a market exit i.
3. Take the unbounded propensity score x
0
^
 and the vector  (where  is
a subset of x) that contains important matching variables signicant at
the 5 per cent level in the probit estimate (initial rm size, start-up year
as well as a dummy variable indicating if the rm comes from Eastern
or Western Germany
10
) to calculate the distance
d
ij
= (x
0
i
^
; 
i
)
0
  (x
0
j
^
; 
j
)
0
8 j = 1 : : : N
survive
for every combination of the market exit i and every surviving rm j.
Then calculate the Mahalanobis distance
MD
ij
= d
ij
0
Cov
 1
d
ij
8 j = 1 : : :N
survive
to nd the nearest neighbor. Cov represents the covariance matrix based
on the surviving rms.
4. The surviving rm j with the smallest Mahalanobis distance serves as a
control observation in the following success analysis. If more than one
rm has the same Mahalanobis distance the comparison observation is
drawn randomly.
5. Remove the i-th rm from the pool of market exits but return the selected
control observation in the pool of surviving rms. This is done because
of the relatively small number of surviving (control) rms.
6. Repeat steps 2. to 5. to nd the matched pairs for all market exits.
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This dummy variable was overweighted tenfold to ensure that the counterpart of every
Western (Eastern) German exiting rm is a Western (Eastern) German surviving rm.
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4.2 Results
Table 2 measures the statistical \similarity" of the observations that remain
after the matching procedure. Colums 2 and 3 contain the means of the vari-
ables of the exiting and the matched surviving rms. Matching is regarded as
successful if the means of the relevant variables in both groups do not dier
signicantly. For this reason the fourth row of Table 2 contains the values
of mutual t-tests that the dierences of the means in both groups equal zero.
For most variables the dierences are small and not statistically signicant.
Only the shares of rms operating in wholesale and building (basic construc-
tion) dier signicantly between both groups at the 5 resp. 10 per cent level
of signicance in the mutual t-test (see Table 2). Moreover, the unbounded
propensity score (x
0
^
), as a summary measure of various variables, does not
dier signicantly between both groups, indicating a good t of the matching
algorithm applied. The lower half of Figure 2 shows kernel density estimates
of the unbounded propensity scores for both groups. The overlap is nearly
perfect
11
and underlines the quality of the matching procedure.
>> insert Table 2 about here <<
In the empirical analyses the year-to-year continuous growth rate
growth
t;t 1
= ln(employment
t
)  ln(employment
t 1
)
serves as a success indicator.
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Table 3 contains the average growth rates for
the rms that belong to the exit cohorts 1995 until 1998 as well as the mean
growth rates of the matched control groups, i.e. surviving rms. We compare
the growth rates of both groups up to four years prior to the exit year of the
11
Here, kernel density estimates instead of histograms serve as tool to show the similarity
in the relative frequencies (probability density) since both groups contain the same number
of observations after the matching process.
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The results only change marginally when the discrete growth rate
growth
t;t 1
= (employment
t
  employment
t 1
)=employment
t 1
is used. In addition, the
specication used is only valid for small growth rates. The small mean growth rates, however,
support the approach used.
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respective cohorts. Not surprisingly, all exit cohorts realize signicant lower
growth rates than their matched partners in the year of market exit. More
interesting is the evaluation in the years before to obtain more information of
whether and when rms that will leave the market start to reduce their em-
ployment. In the year before market exit all cohorts perform worse on average,
though it should be noted that the dierence is not signicant for the 1996
exit cohort. Two years prior to exit the mean growth rates of the comparison
observations are still higher but statistically signicant only for the 1996 exit
cohort. Three years before market exit signicantly higher growth rates of
the surviving rms appear again for the 1996 cohort. For the 1995 cohort the
exiting rms perform better but the values rarely dier. In the last time pe-
riod observed signicant dierences only appear for the 1995 exit cohort. For
the 1998 and 1996 cohorts the exiting rms have slightly higher growth rates.
In the remaining two cohorts the survivors perform better. All these things
together, the results indicate that the exiting rms show a worse performance
compared to the matched surviving rms in the years before exit.
13
>> insert Table 3 about here <<
To control this nding a pooling of the observations from all exiting cohorts
takes place. A comparison of the average growth rates leads to signicantly
higher values in the group of the matched surviving rms in all periods up
to three years before market drop-out (see last column in Table 4).
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This
nding supports the result obtained that market exits perform worse in the
last three years of existence compared to rms that survive. Since the rms do
not dier in observable characteristics at start-up we compare two groups with
equal initial conditions. Unobservable characteristics at start-up or conditions
13
Due to the relatively small number of observations, signicant dierences do not appear
in all observed cases.
14
The increased number of observations in the t-tests is one reason for these signicant
dierences.
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that presuppose the market drop-out over time inuence the probability of a
market exit and seperate the rms later on. At some point in time the rms
recognize that their productivity level is not viable. This is in accordance with
Ericson and Pakes (1995). Firms owners can pursue two possible strategies
at this point. First, they have a strong connection with the rm and want
to stay in the market as long as possible (passive strategy). These owners
will reduce employment gradually until the day of market exit. Second, the
owners recognise that rm productivity to low to survive. Hence, they dismiss
employees to raise the productivity to a viable level (active strategy). But
in many cases these rms will nevertheless leave the market in the end. The
empirical analyses show that a period of time exist between recognizing a not
viable productivity level and exiting the market in case of both strategies. One
thing the rms do is to reduce employment. The results of the analyses show
that the employment adjusting process starts approximately 3 years prior to
market exit.
>> insert Table 4 about here <<
An interesting picture emerges when we run separate pooled analyses for West-
ern and Eastern Germany. Since the matching process yielded nearly the same
number of observations from Western and Eastern Germany in the groups of
exiting and surviving rms, this separation can be carried out (see mean com-
parison in Table 2).
15
The familiar pattern ermerges for Western German
rms. The matched comparison observations show higher growth rates up to
three years before market exit. Signicant dierences, however, appear in the
group of Eastern German rms only in the year of market exit and in the year
before. This might be an indicator that the time period between anticipating
and realizing the market exit is shorter for Eastern German rms. Better -
15
Only in two cases the partner for an exiting rm fromWestern Germany was an Eastern
German surviving rm.
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nancial resources of Western German rms which can postpone the impending
market exit longer may be one reason for this observation. Moreover, uncer-
tain economic conditions in Eastern Germany and rm founders with only few
entrepreneurial experiences led to market exits immediately after recognizing
that the rm is not viable.
Additionally, it was tested how many of the exiting rms of every cohort expe-
rienced gradual employment losses or did not change their number of employees
in the years prior to market exit. Table 5 summarises the results that dier
somewhat from those in Wagner (1999).
16
Between 23 and 71 percent of the
exiting rms decrease their employment or at least stagnate over a time period
of 5 years before market exit. These shares increase steadily when moving to
the point of market exit (see Table 5). The higher share of rms that reduce
employment or stagnate over a 5-year-interval for later exit cohorts is partly
due to business cycle eects. The reunication boom implies a smaller proba-
bility of shrinking employment over a certain time period in the early 1990s in
comparison to the end of the decade. And rms that left the market in 1995
and had been observed for a 5 year period had gained to a greater extent from
this boom phase than rms that left the market in subsequent years. There-
fore, during an economic recession a downward adjustment in the number of
employees is more likely for a rm that leaves the market at the end of the
90s.
>> insert Table 5 about here <<
To check these results we use the surviving comparison rms as a benchmark
(see lower part in Table 5). Not surprisingly, the survivors do not exhibit
decreasing or stagnating employment patterns as often as the exiting rms.
16
Four points must be mentioned here to understand the dierent results. Wagner (1999)
uses businesses instead of rms and he does not restrict the analyses to new rms. Moreover,
he concentrates on the manufacturing sector in the federal state of Lower Saxony.
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But the shares increase if the evaluation period becomes shorter, i.e. the \hy-
pothetical" point of market exit comes closer. The dierences between both
groups (i.e. exits and survivors) range from about 6 to 34 per cent. Similar to
the exiting rms we observe a business cycle eect for the matched survivors,
too. This conrms the ndings for the market exits. Surviving rms assigned
to exits in 1998 reveal higher shares of rms with decreasing or stagnating
employment patterns than rms assigned to exits in 1995. While the period
under evaluation falls mainly in a economic recession for the 1998 cohort, the
1995 cohort gained from the reunication boom.
>> insert Table 6 about here <<
The German economy experienced after the reunication considerable eco-
nomic growth in the beginning of the 90s (boom period) followed by shrinking
growth (recession) since 1995 (see Table 6). Firms founded at the beginning of
the boom phase (1990 or 1991) had a higher probability to break even faster
than rms founded in 1992 or 1993. After break even the rms could build up
ressources enabling them to resist bad economic conditions for a longer time.
Hence, the earlier the rms have been founded the longer they could build up
ressources before the recession started. Firms that exited the market in 1995
or 1996 have foundation dates in 1990 and 1991 and the matched surviving
rms, too, since the year of start-up was a major matching criterion.
17
Market
exits in 1997 or 1998, however, have foundation dates between 1990 and 1993.
These rms faced worse economic conditions in the years prior to market exit
compared to the exit cohorts of 1995 and 1996. And this partly explains the
higher shares of rms with continuing employment reductions or stagnation in
the years before market exit.
17
5 observations in the group of surviving rms have an other year of foundation than
their counterparts from the group of exiting rms.
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4.3 Sensitivity of the results
One point must be mentioned in connection with these results. Due to the fact
that some surviving rms have the exact same values in the matching charac-
teristics, the results in the success analysis may change slightly when matching
takes place several times. This is so because every time the matching proce-
dure is carried out, the observations are sorted randomly and surviving rms
with the same set of characteristics exhibit the same Mahalanobis distance
with respect to a given exiting rm. In case these distances are the smallest
ones for the selected exiting rm, the selection of the comparison observation
occurs randomly and may change from time to time. However, this does not
change the main results of the analysis. The matched surviving rms expe-
rience higher growth rates in the years before exit for all exit cohorts. The
signicance of these dierences, however, changes in some cases.
Moreover, to test the sensitivity of the obtained results the data sample at
hand was extended in several ways:
 include observations with the foundation dates 1989 and 1994,
 include observations that have up to two missing employment gures
that are not in the beginning or end of the employment history and
interpolate them,
 include observations that are partial or complete take-overs but have a
foundation date from 1990 until 1993
The inclusion of these observations does not change the main results.
18
The
matched surviving rms show higher growth rates in the years before market
exit, but the number of signicant dierences changes. The results, however,
remain stable for the pooled groups. The growth dierences are signicant up
to three years before exit for all specications in the groups of all and Western
German rms and up to one year before market exit for the Eastern German
rms.
18
The results are not reported, but are available on request.
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5 Summary
Using a rich data set of rms founded at the beginning of the 1990s we examine
the performance of market exits in the years before market drop-out. In the
analyses the growth patterns of rms that survive but do not dier in important
characteristics measured at start-up serve as a benchmark. A non-parametric
matching procedure was applied to generate this group of potential comparison
observations. In this way the paper contributes empirically to conrm the
stylized fact that market exits start to deteriorate in their performance a few
years before the drop-out when they have realized that their strategy is not
viable.
The results can be summarized as follows. First, rms belonging to dierent
exit cohorts achieve on average smaller growth rates compared to the surviving
rms selected. The dierences remain up to three years before market drop
out of the respective cohort and are signicant in a number of cases. Pooling
the observations of the individual exit cohort leads to a signicantly better
performance of the selected surviving rms up to three years before market
drop-out. This indicates that the point in time in which rms start to prepare
their future market drop-out is about three years before it actually happens.
The results indicate that performance dierences between both rm groups
are not at all random, i.e. business cycle, demand uctuations, rationalization
processes etc. Firms that exit the market rather anticipate this fact and react
with gradual downward employment adjustments in the years before market
exit. Separate analyses for Eastern and Western Germany reveal that the time
period between anticipating and realizing the market exit is shorter in Eastern
Germany than in Western Germany.
Second, the phenomenon called \shadow of death" sneaking around the corner
exists using the data set. There is a considerable number of exiting rms that
experience continuing employment losses or an employment stagnation over a
certain time period before market exit.
15
Third, a business cycle eect becomes obvious. Firms that exit in 1995 as well
as their surviving counterparts perform better in the years before exit than
rms belonging to the remaining cohorts.
16
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of rm size from 1990 until 1999
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Figure 2: Histograms and kernel density estimates of the unbounded propensity
scores (x
0
) before and after the matching process
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
variable mean/share STDV
average growth rate in
1990/91 0.184 0.421
1991/92 0.149 0.340
1992/93 0.107 0.297
1993/94 0.109 0.342
1994/95 0.054 0.278
1995/96 0.024 0.253
1996/97 0.005 0.269
1997/98 0.005 0.263
1998/99 -0.018 0.276
rms founded in
1990 0.276 /
1991 0.268 /
1992 0.245 /
1993 0.211 /
number of rm owners
one 0.494 /
2 till 4 0.470 /
5 or more 0.019 /
missing 0.017 /
industry classication
manufacturing 0.125 /
building 0.196 /
trade 0.458 /
services 0.221 /
human capital endowment of founder(s)
very high 0.035 /
high 0.277 /
medium 0.427 /
low 0.039 /
missing 0.221 /
regional origin
founded in Western Germany 0.406 /
county with high density 0.453 /
county with medium density 0.349 /
county with low density 0.197 /
rms involved in start-up 0.086 /
size at start-up 6.675 24.050
liability limiting legal form 0.421 /
number of observation 1,795
Source: ZEW-Foundation Panels East and West, telephone survey.
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Table 2: Mean comparison of selected variables between sur-
vivors and market exits
variable mean of variable t-value
surviving rms market exits
initial size 8.024 8.529 -0.249
start-up in 1990 0.308 0.314 -0.203
start-up in 1991 0.272 0.272 0.000
start-up in 1992 0.262 0.260 0.071
start-up in 1993 0.158 0.154 0.173
liability limiting legal form 0.464 0.465 -0.063
manufacturing (low tech) 0.073 0.081 -0.471
manufacturing (high tech) 0.022 0.028 -0.607
building (basic construction) 0.061 0.090 -1.779

building (installation & completion) 0.947 0.101 -0.317
car trade 0.071 0.063 0.502
retail trade 0.101 0.120 -1.001
wholesale 0.284 0.223 2.241

transport & communication 0.057 0.069 -0.774
business related services 0.178 0.156 0.926
consumption related servces 0.059 0.069 -0.641
rms involved in start-up 0.059 0.053 0.409
one rm owner 0.418 0.432 -0.444
2 till 4 owner persons 0.540 0.521 0.629
5 or more owner persons 0.014 0.026 -1.355
number of owner persons missing 0.028 0.022 0.607
very high human capital 0.047 0.039 0.616
high human capital 0.308 0.296 0.410
nedium human capital 0.375 0.393 -0.581
low human capital 0.053 0.061 -0.541
missing human capital 0.217 0.211 0.230
start-up in Western Germany 0.477 0.473 0.123
high dense county 0.491 0.458 0.107
medium dense county 0.351 0.365 -0.458
low dense county 0.158 0.178 -0.840
unbounded propensity score (x
0
i
^
) -0.450 -0.494 -0.840
number of observations 507 507 /
Source: ZEW-Foundation Panels East and West, telephone survey.
Note:

(

) indicate signicant dierent means between
both groups in a mutual t-test at the 5 (10) per cent level.
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Table 3: Comparison of the continuous employment growth
rates based on the matched pairs for several exit cohorts
year of market exit
1998 1997 1996 1995
period (t; t  1)
growth rate exits -0.080 -0.101 -0.062 -0.114
growth rate survivors -0.127

0.023

0.078

0.080

observations in each group 63 73 68 79
period (t  1; t  2)
growth rate exits -0.064 -0.013 0.016 0.023
growth rate survivors 0.052

0.078

0.046 0.148

observations in each group 63 73 68 79
period (t  2; t  3)
growth rate exits -0.021 0.027 0.094 0.050
growth rate survivors 0.006 0.059 0.213

0.056
observations in each group 63 73 68 64
period (t  3; t  4)
growth rate exits -0.003 0.081 0.015 0.114
growth rate survivors 0.061 0.128 0.130

0.111
observations in each group 63 73 55 50
period (t  4; t  5)
growth rate exits 0.118 0.085 0.164 0.049
growth rate survivors 0.099 0.114 0.152 0.204

observations in each group 63 56 36 23
Source: ZEW-Foundation Panels East and West, telephone survey.
Note:

(

) indicate a signicantl higher growth rate of the surviving
rms in a mutual t-test at the 5 (10) per cent level.
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Table 4: Comparison of the continuous employment growth
rates based on the matched pairs dierentiated between East-
ern and Western Germany
Pooling
a)
of the observations for
Eastern Germany Western Germany Germany
period (t; t  1)
growth rate exits -0.130 -0.042 -0.090
growth rate survivors 0.032

0.030

0.032

observations in each group 155 128 283
period (t  1; t  2)
growth rate exits -0.015 0.003 -0.007
growth rate survivors 0.067

0.106

0.084

observations in each group 155 128 283
period (t  2; t  3)
growth rate exits 0.051 0.023 0.038
growth rate survivors 0.087 0.080

0.084

observations in each group 148 120 268
period (t  3; t  4)
growth rate exits 0.074 0.020 0.051
growth rate survivors 0.099 0.119

0.107

observations in each group 137 104 241
period (t  4; t  5)
growth rate exits 0.138 0.070 0.108
growth rate survivors 0.159 0.090 0.128
observations in each group 100 78 178
Source: ZEW-Foundation Panels East and West, telephone survey.
Note:

(

) indicate a signicantly higher growth rate of the surviving
rms in a mutual t-test at the 5 (10) per cent level.
a)
Pooling for the period (t  2; t  3), for example, includes the
growth rates in 1995/96 for exits in 1998 as well as the matched
pairs up to the growth rates in 1992/93 for market exits in 1995
and their matched pairs
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Table 5: Share of rms that gradually decreases employment
year of market exit
1998 1997 1996 1995
exiting rms
decreasing or stagnating employment before market exit
at least 5 years (in per cent) 0.714 0.425 0.324 0.228
at least 4 years (in per cent) 0.825 0.658 0.559 0.380
at least 3 years (in per cent) 0.873 0.726 0.750 0.570
at least 2 years (in per cent) 0.873 0.836 0.824 0.810
at least 1 year (in per cent) 0.968 0.904 0.926 0.937
matched surviving rms
decreasing or stagnating employment
at least 5 years (in per cent) 0.492 0.260 0.176 0.114
at least 4 years (in per cent) 0.556 0.425 0.265 0.316
at least 3 years (in per cent) 0.635 0.479 0.412 0.392
at least 2 years (in percent) 0.714 0.616 0.603 0.595
at least 1 years (in per cent) 0.857 0.767 0.735 0.722
Source: ZEW-Foundation Panels East and West, telephone survey.
Table 6: Growth of GDP in Germany (in per cent)
year Germany Eastern Germany Western Germany
1990 5.1 / /
1991 3.7 / 9.1
1992 7.9 28.9 6.2
1993 2.8 21.7 1.0
1994 5.2 13.3 4.3
1995 3.4 7.3 3.0
1996 2.3 4.6 2.0
1997 2.9 2.5 2.9
1998 3.7 1.8 3.9
Source: Federal Statistical Oce, Federal Department of
Trade and Industry.
Note: GDP is measurd in current prices.
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